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September 11. Key operations located at the World
Trade Center included several of the important
dealers who made markets in federal government
securities, traders who made markets in foreign
exchange, and brokers who linked the banks that
wanted to borrow and lend federal funds. The
people who performed these functions in our
financial system and the communications infra-
structure they used for making trades and settling
transactions were located in one place. In addition,
the New York Stock Exchange and the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York are located a few
blocks from the World Trade Center. Our national
system for clearing checks was also vulnerable
to disruption. Even a temporary suspension of
air transportation had potential to disrupt the
operation of a significant component of our pay-
ments system, since a large share of the checks
written in the United States move through air
transport to the paying banks.
Efforts of our nation’s financial institutions
and the Fed limited the degree of disruption in the
operation of the payments system and financial
institutions. Success in limiting the damage to the
payments system and the operation of financial
markets and institutions rests upon the financial
strength of our banks and other financial institu-
tions and the quality of their management.
The vulnerability turned out to be the physical
infrastructure of payments and trading systems,
and not the underlying strength of financial serv-
ices firms. These firms and their suppliers proved
to have the capital and the technical resources to
restore damaged infrastructure. It is worth reflect-
ing on this point, as it is not a trivial one. Countries
that have seen the solvency of their financial
firms threatened, such as the United States in
E
leven weeks ago tonight, we were all
in a state of shock. Initial estimates
indicated that about 6,000 people had
perished in the attacks on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon. U.S. financial mar-
kets were closed and all civilian aircraft were
grounded. Some banks had closed some offices
earlier in the day. No one knew the full extent
of the damage, and no one knew when the stock
and bond markets would reopen. Many firms,
both financial and nonfinancial ones, were uncer-
tain how they could meet their obligations com-
ing due in the days ahead, given their uncertainty
over selling securities to raise funds or even
receiving payment on obligations due them.
How the financial system dealt with this
unprecedented situation is not the most important
part of the story of how the nation responded. Still,
the way in which the financial system responded
is a tale worth telling, for, without doubt, a spread-
ing wave of defaults and fears of inflation would
have severely complicated the nation’s efforts to
regain equilibrium and get on with the new war
against terrorism.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, especially
Alton Gilbert, for their comments, but I retain
full responsibility for errors.
VULNERABILITIES AND
STRENGTHS
The operation of our nation’s financial sys-
tem proved to be vulnerable to the attacks ofthe early 1930s and several Asian countries begin-
ning in 1997, suffered far worse economic dam-
age than did the United States in the wake of
September 11.
COPING DURING THE FIRST
WEEK
Developments during the first week after
September 11 were especially important for limit-
ing the impact of the attacks on the operation of
our payments system and financial institutions.
Some parts of the financial system did have their
operations shut down by the collapse of the Twin
Towers, but other parts of the system continued
to function normally. The depth of operational
resources, the capacity to call on backup systems,
and the role of the Federal Reserve in providing
massive amounts of liquidity reflect the robust-
ness of the U.S. financial system.
The electronic payment networks operated
by the Federal Reserve System—Fedwire and
the automated clearinghouse (ACH)—remained
in operation without interruption. Operation of
these systems facilitated the operation of other
segments of the payments system and the settle-
ment of transactions among financial institutions.
The attacks temporarily disrupted market
mechanisms through which banks increase their
reserves, including borrowing in the federal funds
market or selling federal government securities
held as secondary reserves. The Federal Reserve
made large loans through the discount window
to provide liquidity to banks that could not raise
adequate funds through normal mechanisms.
Short-term discount window loans, called adjust-
ment credit, were $99 million on September 5,
but rose to over $45 billion on September 12. By
September 26, adjustment credit had declined to
$20 million; the system had returned to normal
operations.
Extra liquidity injected into the banking sys-
tem flowed to where it was needed. Banks
increased their loans to other banks substantially.
Interbank loans increased from $300 billion on
September 5 to $442 billion on September 12. By
early October, interbank loans had declined to
just above $300 billion. The willingness of banks
to increase their loans to each other by this large
amount on short notice was based on the confi-
dence that they were lending to banks that were
strong financially. The strong capital positions
enjoyed by most banks permitted them to deal
successfully with the disruption of the payments
system.
Trading in the markets for foreign exchange
resumed on September 12. The operation of the
federal funds market and the functions of making
markets in government securities and settling
these transactions resumed within a few days
after September 11. The New York Fed’s main
building, a few blocks west of the World Trade
Center, was undamaged but access was limited
to all but essential personnel because of fear that
a neighboring building might collapse, the large
amount of smoke in lower Manhattan, and the
difficulty of getting people to the building. The
New York Fed’s Open Market Desk, which con-
ducts monetary policy through transactions with
government securities dealers, was able to oper-
ate out of the main building for a time, but on
September 13 relocated to a Fed backup facility
in New Jersey and conducted open market oper-
ations from that office for a time.
The credit card, debit card, and ATM networks
continued to function after the terrorist attacks.
The flow of information among participants in
these systems, including banks and merchants,
occurs over electronic communication networks.
Participants in these systems settled their net
positions over the Fed’s electronic payments net-
works (Fedwire and ACH) in the usual manner.
Our nation’s infrastructure for electronic pay-
ments not only worked but worked well.
Operation of the nation’s check collection
system was a greater challenge during the first
week after September 11. Banks could not collect
checks through air transport. In this crisis situa-
tion, the Fed adopted a policy to minimize poten-
tial disruptions to the use of checks in transactions.
The Reserve Banks accepted checks from banks
for deposit to their reserve accounts as usual and
credited their reserve accounts for the proceeds
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of the Reserve Banks increased substantially
because the Fed could not collect the checks on
the usual schedule. Federal Reserve float added
a fairly typical $2 billion to bank reserves on
September 5, but $23 billion on September 12.
The Fed’s policy of accepting checks for deposit
and crediting the accounts of collecting banks on
the usual availability schedule facilitated the rela-
tively smooth operation of one important phase
in check collection: banks accepting checks from
customers and crediting their accounts on the
basis of the usual collection schedule.
The collection of many checks was delayed
for several days. The contrast between the unin-
terrupted operation of the credit card and debit
card systems, which occurs primarily over elec-
tronic communication systems, and the tempo-
rary disruptions in the check collection process,
illustrates the potential benefit of shifting check
collection to an electronic system.
Only a relatively few people withdrew more
cash than usual from their bank accounts. The
Fed was able to help banks meet this demand for
cash by providing additional cash from the vaults
of the Reserve Banks. Because the banks and the
Fed made clear to the public that cash was and
would remain readily available, the unusual
demand for cash never became very large and
quickly subsided.
AFTER THE FIRST WEEK
Our nation’s financial system returned to more
normal operation during the second week after
September 11. Although the government bond
market reopened Thursday, September 13, normal
market functioning could not be re-established
until the equity markets reopened, which occurred
on Monday, September 17. Market averages
declined when the trading of shares resumed, but
the operation of the markets did not show signs
of panic selling. Stock prices tended to change
in a rational pattern, with the largest percentage
declines in the prices of the shares of companies
that appeared to be most adversely affected by the
attacks. Settlement of trades occurred in almost
the usual orderly fashion. To provide extra time
for processing in the Treasury securities market,
trades conducted on September 13 and 14 were
settled three days after the trades, and five days
after for trades on September 17 through
September 21; starting Monday, September 24,
trades were settled on the normal next-day basis.
The large increases in bank reserves during
the first week after September 11 were reversed
during the second week, as more checks reached
the paying banks and banks repaid their loans
from the Fed’s discount window. Interbank loans
declined as the temporary disruptions in the oper-
ation of the financial markets ended.
One of the reasons why payments systems
worked in a crisis situation is that these systems
have implemented arrangements for limiting the
risk assumed by each participant through credit
extended to counterparties in the payments sys-
tems. In addition, banks have relatively high
ratios of equity to total assets. Although relatively
large banks have experienced an increase in prob-
lem loans since 1997, bank capital ratios remain
substantially higher than during the last period
of major problems in the banking industry, in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. One of the factors
that could have caused disruptions in payments
arrangements would have been an unwillingness
of participants to extend credit to each other. I am
not aware of evidence that this problem occurred.
The supervisory authorities in the United
States are committed to keeping our banking
industry in sound financial condition. Banks
that suffer losses that compromise their capital
positions are closed or reorganized unless their
shareholders inject additional equity. The expe-
rience of the United States savings and loan indus-
try in the 1980s, and of other nations, especially
Japan, demonstrates the problems inherent in the
alternative supervisory policy of forbearance when
losses deplete the capital of financial firms. An
economy cannot grow if its major financial insti-
tutions remain in weak financial condition for an
extended period of time. Moreover, such firms
would not have the strength to withstand a shock
of the magnitude of September 11.
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EXPERIENCE FOR THE FUTURE
While we cannot know whether we have
more terrorist attacks in our future, the operation
of our payments system and financial institu-
tions after September 11 gives us a basis for opti-
mism about our nation’s ability to cope with
future events. This capacity rests on a continu-
ing commitment to some basic principles.
First, the Fed as the central bank must inject
additional reserves into the banking system tem-
porarily during a financial crisis. This point is so
well understood in the country and certainly
within the Fed that I have no doubt that liquidity
would flow freely as needed even if, horrible to
contemplate, a significant fraction of the Fed’s
leadership were lost in terrorist attacks.
Second, our government supervisory agencies
must maintain a commitment to policies that
promote the financial strength of our financial
institutions. This strength includes sound capital
positions and robust contingency plans for main-
taining or restoring operations. The Fed and
financial firms across the country had prepared
extensively for possible disruptions during several
years of Y2K preparations. Those preparations
were so successful that the century rollover
occurred with practically no problems whatsoever,
and the extensive contingency plans remained
on the shelf. The contingency plans did pay off,
however, on September 11 and the days that fol-
lowed. I’m willing to speculate that every financial
firm in the country, and many others as well, are
now re-examining and strengthening their con-
tingency plans. The U.S. financial system is being
made even more robust.
My remarks have focused implicitly on the
banking system and to a lesser extent on the secu-
rities trading system. I would be remiss, however,
if I did not mention explicitly the insurance
industry. Insured losses from September 11 will
be immense, and yet insurance firms have main-
tained such strong capital positions and such
carefully controlled risks, through reinsurance
and other devices, that to my knowledge no insur-
ance companies face the risk of insolvency from
these losses. That fact is a fine testament to the
quality of financial management of these firms.
People are always interested in my thoughts
about the probable direction of the economy in
the months ahead, and so I’ll offer a few reflections
on that subject. As you may know, the National
Bureau of Economic Research announced yester-
day that its Business Cycle Dating Committee
had reached the conclusion that a recession is in
progress; the Committee dated the cycle peak in
March of this year.
There is no way to tell now when the reces-
sion trough will occur. We face many uncertain-
ties, including the possibility of further terrorist
attacks. Such attacks, if they occur, will obviously
be negative for the economic outlook. The uncer-
tainties, however, are not all on the negative side.
The campaign in Afghanistan seems to be going
well, and there is some probability that the FBI
will get to the bottom of the anthrax attacks.
Success on those fronts would help to clear the
air and would be positive for the economy.
Although the U.S. economy is in a recession,
I am certainly not pessimistic about our economic
prospects. Indeed, I am optimistic because we
have such great strengths in our situation. We are
a resourceful people, and, because our economy
is largely organized through competitive markets,
we are responding quickly to the new situation.
Bank capital positions are strong; inflation is low
and expected to remain low. In some past periods
of stress, weak bank capital and rising inflation
considerably complicated the situation. The fed-
eral government entered this period in strong fiscal
condition, which means that the resources are
available to meet our security needs without
concern that a budget deficit is out of control.
Finally, both monetary policy and fiscal policy
had turned expansionary before September 11.
There is no way to provide a reliable forecast
of how quickly these fundamental strengths will
show themselves in a clear revival of economic
growth. But they will, within a matter of a few
months or few calendar quarters. Of that, I’m
confident.
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